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§.1   Until  the advent of modern predicate logic as inaugurated by Gottlob Frege and 
codified in Whitehead’s and Russell’s Principia Mathematica,  Aristotle’s term logic of 
natural language, was ‘primary logic’ and the Stoic logic of propositions was 
secondary.  After Frege and the Principia, the primacy was reversed.  As the Kneales  
say of the  Stoics: 
The logic of propositions which they studied is more fundamental than 
the logic of general terms which Aristotle studied in the sense that … it is 
presupposed by the second [which] is primary because it must come at the 
beginning of any systematic development.  If we adopt this practice, we reserve 
the title, ‘general logic’ for the study in which we are concerned not only with the 
notions of negation, conjunction, disjunction and disjunction  but also with the 
notions of  generality expressed by ‘every’ and ‘some.’ General logic, so 
defined,  includes primary logic… and cannot be developed without it… Within 
this scheme Aristotle’s syllogistic  takes its place as a fragment of general logic, 
in which theorems of primary logic are assumed.1   
                                                 
1
 William and Martha Kneale, The Development of 
Logic,  Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 511. 
 
1
 Cf. Fred Sommers, THE LOGIC OF NATURAL LANGUAGE, CHAPTER 9.  
OXFORD, CLARENDON PRESS.1982  
 
 
  
2 
2 
 
General or modern logic,  is what we  today call ‘predicate logic.’  In Modern           
Predicate Logic (MPL), ‘Every man is mortal’ has the form ‘For every x, if x is a man then 
x is mortal’ and ‘some man is wise’ has the form ‘There is an x, such that x is a man and 
x is wise,’ respectively  incorporating the conditional and conjunctive forms  of primary 
logic in  the categorical propositions of syllogistic logic.  MPL regiments multiply 
general sentences with the conditional and conjunctive forms  of primary logic in 
formally accounting  for an  inference like  
(T) Some sea turtle is older than every human, hence every human is younger than 
some sea turtle.   In proving the validity of (TM),  MPL expresses its premise as the 
quantified conjunction 
(P*) There is an x such x is a sea turtle and For every y, if  y is a human being then x is 
older than y  
                     x(Turtlex & (y(Humany ⊃ Olderxy))                      
and its conclusion as the quantified conditional  
(C*) For every y, if y is a human, there is an x such that x is a sea turtle and x is older 
than y    
                   y(Humany ⊃ x(Turtlex & Olderxy)) 
and showing that  ‘(P*) ⊃(C*)’ is a logically true or  ‘(P*) & (C*)’ is logically false. 
 
       It is now generally assumed that traditional (Aristotelian) term logic of natural 
language is  deductively weak, being incapable of accounting for the validity of 
arguments like (T) which  involve  relational sentences, that have predicates with more 
than one general subject.  Michael Dummett’s view of the revolution that Frege wrought 
and that Principia Mathematica codified, is  fairly representative: 
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        Modern logic stands in contrast to all the great logical 
systems of the past… in being able to give an account of 
sentences … that depends upon the mechanism of  quantifiers 
and bound variables. For all the subtlety of the earlier 
systems, the analysis of the structure of the sentences of 
human language which is afforded by modern logic is, by its 
capacity to handle multiple generality, shown to be far deeper 
than they were able to attain. (1993: xxxii).  
    A traditional logic confined to sentences of natural language  seemed  unable to 
account for inferences involving relations.  and multiply general sentences.  To deal 
with an inference like (T),  Frege devised a symbolic language into which  one recasts  
‘Some sea turtle is older than every human’ in a notation  of quantifiers and bound 
variables. Says Dummett:   “Frege had [thereby] solved the problem which had baffled 
logicians for millennia by ignoring natural language.”   P20  
             That Predicate Logic, in contrast to traditional term logic, could account for 
arguments involving “multiply general” propositions exposes the double mistake of 
regarding  syllogistic logic as primary logic and of regarding  the variable-free  
sentences of natural language as adequate vehicles for facilitating  logical inference.    
         According to Dummett Frege believed that “natural language is in principle  
incoherent.” And he says: “Undoubtedly his predisposition to adopt such a belief  was 
formed by the experience which the discovery of the quantifier-variable notation had 
given him.” P21    
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      It is certainly  true that Aristotle’s logic of natural language had  provided no clear 
way to handle arguments with relational sentences. Augustus de Morgan had pointed 
this out, as had Leibniz before him. But preFregean logicians did not believe, nor is it in 
fact true,  that a logic of natural language  cannot  formally  validate an inference like (T) 
without regimenting its premise  and conclusion  as sentences that embody  forms of  
‘primary’  logic and some form of quantifier/variable analysis . One may rightly point out 
that  pre-Fregean logicians did not know how to validate  inferences involving multiple 
generality.  But that does not mean that a  traditional logic of natural language  is in 
principle  incapable of  providing a formal, variable-free account of them, that does not 
presuppose the primacy of propositional logic. 2   And there is reason to believe that  a 
variable-free account is an account is possible.     
           Consider  a  child that knows that  all horses are animals. An averagely bright 8 
year old can intuitively reason ‘So anyone that rides (owns, feeds, sees…) a horse  rides 
(owns, feeds, sees…) an animal.’    She must then have  applied some legitimate method  
of reasoning that  instantly gets her from ‘every X is Y’ to ‘So every R to an X, is R to a 
Y.’  What method can that be?    Asking that  question is a bit like a bewildered 
spectator asking how a conjurer could possibly  have rapidly  pulled  several rabbits out 
of a small hat. How does he do that?  Indeed, a child’s ability to  move “with the speed 
of thought”  from ‘all horses are animals’ to ‘every rider  of a horse is a rider  of an 
animal’ not only raises  the question of how she makes that inference so quickly but  
how she  can make that inference at any speed.  Since she reasons in the variable free 
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sentences of natural  language, she ought not be able to make that inference at all, let 
alone make it in a split second.  It takes a trained logician several minutes to derive  
‘every rider  of a horse is a rider  of an animal’ ‘from ‘all horses are animals.’ For he first 
translates the sentences into the notation of predicate logic and then, using laws of 
quantifier  interchange and primary logic he  shows in about 8 carefully justified steps,  
that  ‘x[(Horsex ⊃ Animalx) ⊃ {y(Horsey& x(Riderxy ⊃z(Animalz&Ridesyz)}]’ is a 
logical truth.  
        No child can reason in the manner of modern predicate logic. But it is an undenialb 
efact  It is a fact that even children reason intuitively, rapidly,  and correctly with 
multiply general sentences.   So, outside of the classroom,  do trained logicians.   In  
THE MENO, Plato asked how children and other logically untutored human beings  are   
capable of intuitive reasoning.  That raises a question that is   neither asked nor 
answered  by practitioners of modern predicate logic: how does a child intuitively and 
instantly infer  ‘every R to an A is R to a B’ ‘from ‘every A  is B’ in a language that lacks 
the quantifier/bound variable mechanism of modern predicate logic?  An adequate 
answer must present a legitimate logical method that  can be applied in milliseconds to 
the variable-free sentences of natural language in which a child reasons.   
§.2  If we go back to a prefregean  time when logicians thought of logic as  the science 
that describes  how we actually reason in natural language,  we find Thomas Hobbes in 
the 17th century confidently stating that  we reason intuitively in an algebraic manner:   
“By the ratiocination of our mind, we add and subtract in our silent thoughts, without 
  
6 
6 
the use of words.”3   The Kneales say  that  Hobbes thought of reasoning  as “a species 
of computation” but they note that “his writing contain in fact no attempt to work out 
such a project.” 4  
      Later in the 17
th
 century, Leibniz endorsed Hobbes  view:  
 Thomas Hobbes, everywhere a profound examiner of principles,    rightly stated 
that everything done by our mind is a computation by which is to be understood 
either the addition of a sum or the subtraction of a difference. So just as there are 
two primary signs of algebra and analytics, + and –, in the same way there are, as it 
were, two copulas. 5 
      Though Leibniz talks of the plus/minus character of the positive and negative 
copulas,  neither  he nor Hobbes say anything about the plus/minus character of the 
other common logical words that mentally drive our intuitive, everyday deductive 
judgments,  words like  ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘if’, and ‘and’, each of which actually turns out to  
have an oppositive,  +/-,   character that  allows us, in our “silent thoughts”  to ignore its 
literal meaning and to reckon with it as one simply  reckons with a plus or a minus 
operator in elementary algebra or arithmetic.    These  ‘logical constants’ of  natural 
language propel our reasoning.  Because  Hobbes and Leibniz did not focus attention 
on the +/- character of natural language’s logical constants,  they did not  provide a  
guide for  a research program that could  develop a  +/-  logic that describes what goes 
on actual  ‘ratiocination.’  I will argue  that  a  developed  +/- logic  provides a way back 
from modern predicate logic  --- the logic of quantifiers and bound variables, which 
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became ‘standard logic’ in the last century – to   Aristotle’s  term logic of natural 
language that had been standard logic for millennia.   
 I do not believe that Aristotle has been legitimately supplanted.  Using Aristotle’s 
common sense conception  of the logical form of the categorical sentences of natural 
language, I will show how a child, using its native language moves “logibraically” with 
“the speed of thought” from ‘All horses are animals’ to ‘It can’t possibly be true that  
someone riding a horse isn’t riding an animal.’  
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         §.2.1   Some years ago, preoccupied with the question of intuitive reasoning  that Plato 
had raised in the  Meno  and without realizing that I was corroborating  Hobbes’s 
conjecture,  I discovered that the ‘LOGICAL CONSTANTS’ of natural language that figure 
prominently in our intuitive everyday reasoning  could be reckoned with as one reckons 
with the plus/minus  operators in  elementary algebra.6  I found, for example,  that  ‘is,’ 
‘and’,  ‘some,’ and ‘then,’ are  “PLUS-WORDS”  but  that ‘isn’t,’ ‘not,’ ’all,’ and ‘if,’   are  
“MINUS-WORDS.” 
               Natural language  is our language of thought.  In reasoning  intuitively we 
unconsciously exploit the +/- character of the familiar logical words that drive  
‘ratiocination;’  we  reckon  with a positively or negatively charged logical constant of 
natural language as if it were a plus or minus operator in a  simple expression of 
elementary algebra. As Plato noted, children have some innate algebraic know-how.  
For example, in some form a child knows that addition is commutative.  Suppose too 
that it innately treats ‘is’ and ‘some’ as “plus-words.”  Reckoning with the plus/minus 
character of the  natural constants enables a young child to instantly recognize that 
‘some{+} teachers are{+}  men’ “says the same thing” ‘some{+} men are{+} teachers.’  A 
nine year child  can reckon that  ‘Some{+} dogs aren’t{-} friendly,’   is “logibraically” 
equivalent to  Not{-}: All{-} dogs  are{+} friendly’:  
Discursively:   Not{-}:  All{-} Dogs are{+}Friendly  ≡   Some{+}Dogs aren’t{-}Friendly  
                                                                                                       
Logibraically:     -    (    -    Dogs   +  Friendly)    =      +     Dogs      –     Friendly 
     
   I eventually came to believe that we mentally reason by instinctively exploiting the 
algebraic, +/- character of the logical constants of natural language.  ‘And’ is a plus-
word.  One way a teenager may quickly get from ‘Every-  horse is+  an animal’ to ‘so 
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every- owner of a+ horse is+ an owner of an+ animal’ is  to add a tautological premise and 
to infer a conclusion from the  two premises:  
Every{-}Horse is{+} an Animal  and{+} Every{-} Owner of a{+}Horse is{+} an Owner a{+} Horse: 
Conjoining them yields the conclusion, ‘Every- Owner of a+ Horse is+ an Owner of an+ 
Animal.’                     [-H+A] + [-(O+H)+(O+H)]  =>     [-(O+H)+(O+A)] 
          Or the teenager may reason indirectly, showing it can’t possibly be true  that 
some owner of a horse isn’t an owner of an animal. For if that were true, we should 
have:    
(i) Every- horse is+ an animal and+ (ii) Some
+ owner of a+ horse doesn’t- own an+ animal. 
From these two premises it would absurdly  follow that 
(iii)Some+ owner of an+ animal doesn’t- own an+ animal: 
           (i) [-H+A]  + (ii) [+(O+H) -(O+A)]  =>   (iii) +(O+A) – (O+A) 
                                                            (i)           -H+A 
                                                        +  (ii)  +(O+H) -(O+A) 
                                                        (iii) +(O+A) – (O+A) 
 
(iii) is unacceptable but (i) is true: To avoid the unacceptable reductio  conclusion, we 
must reject and negate premise (ii).  Since –[+(O+H) -(O+A)] = -(O+H)+(O+A),  we  
indirectly arrive at  ‘-(O+H)+(O+A)’: Every owner of a horse is an owner of an animal.  
     Since sapient animals  have evolved to  natively possess  some rudimentary 
algebraic  know-how,  both the direct and indirect ways of reasoning are available even 
to a child.  
 
§3.        Aristotle’s logic of terms preceded the Stoic logic of psitions by some two 
hundred years.  In Aristotle’s day and for more than two thousand years thereafter, term 
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logic was ‘primary logic.’ Indeed Leibniz, who regarded term logic as primary logic,  
looked for a way to incorporate propositional logic as a special branch of term logic: 
 If as I hope, I can conceive all propositions as terms, and hypotheticals as categoricals, 
 and if I can treat all propositions universally, this promises a wonderful ease in my 
 symbolism and . . . will be a discovery of the greatest importance.73 
              In my view, neither logic  is “primary.”  However,   Leibniz’s hope of a unified 
logibraic syntax becomes a reality the moment we extend the +/– calculus to 
propositional connectives like ‘if’…then’ and ‘both …and’ as in 
‘If p then q’ and ‘not(both p and not q)’.    
Just as we logibraically represent  the  logical equivalence {-}  {+} 
                                       All{-} X is{+} Y ≡  Not{-}: Some{+} X is not{-}Y 
as                                                -X+Y =     -(+X + (-Y)), 
 so we logibraically represent the logical  equivalence 
                                            if{-} p then{+} q   ≡  not{-}: both{+} p and not{-}-q  
as                                                 -p+q   =       -(+p +(-q) 
                      WHY ‘IF’ IS A MINUS WORD AND ‘THEN’ IS A PLUS-WORD. 
 Consider the propositional conjunction ‘both p and q’. Intuitively, the words ‘and’ 
and ‘both’ behave as plus-operators. Their plus-like character is evident in the 
commutative character of the conjunction ‘Both p and q’, where ‘and’ and ‘both’ behave 
like the addition operators in the algebraic expression ‘+x+y’. 
  Both{+} p And{+} q  Both q And p 
                               
      +     p   +      q    +    q   +   p 
 
                The equivalence shows that ‘both’ and ‘and’ are “plus-words.” 
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 We can therefore  transcribe ‘Not: both p and not-q’ as ‘–(+p+(–q))’. 
Not: both p and not-q 
                                                                                 
                                                             –     ( + p    +  (  – q)) 
 
 But what is the +/– transcription of ‘if...then’?  Neither ‘if’ nor ‘then’ has an obviously 
plus-like or minus-like character. However, we know that ‘Not: both p and not-q)’ 
transcribes as ‘–(+p+(–q)) and also know  that ‘If p then q’ is logically equivalent to ‘Not: 
both p and not-q’. We may therefore  determine the plus/minus character of ‘If p then q’ 
by equating  ‘If{?} then{?} q’ to  ‘Not{-} (both{+} p and not{-}q)’: 
             If{?} pthen{?} q        =def Not: both p and not-q 
                                             
        – p + q           =def   –  (   + p      + (  – q))  
The definitional  equivalence of ‘‘if p then q’ to ‘not: both p and not-q’ uncovers the 
logibraic character of ‘if’ and ‘then’:  ‘If’ is a minus word and ‘then’  is a plus word. 
************************* 
   Note the difference between expressing the equivalence of ‘If p then q’  to ‘Not: both p 
and not-q’ in the conventional symbolism as  
                                  pq    ~(p&~q) 
and expressing it “logibraically” as 
                                –p+q  =  –(+p+(–q)) 
In the conventional notation, one proves the equivalence by truth tables. In logibraic 
notation,  the does not need tol be explained or proven; it is perspicuous as an 
algebraic truism. 
 Among the basic inference patterns in standard propositional logic are the principles 
knows as Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens and Hypothetical Syllogism. All are 
perspicuous in the +/– notation: 
 Modus Ponens  Modus Tollens Hypothetical Syllogism 
       –p+q   –p+q   –p+q 
         p                  –q       –q+r 
          q    –p            –p+r 
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  §4   Here is a very partial but representative list of natural language constants that 
figure  in everyday intuitive reasoning: 
‘SOME’(‘A’..), ‘IS’ (‘WAS,’ ‘WILL BE,’ ETC.), ‘BOTH,’ ‘AND’, and ‘THEN’ are “PLUS- WORDS;” 
‘EVERY,’(‘ALL,’’ANY’..),’NOT,’ (‘NO,’ ‘AIN’T,’ ‘UN-,’ ETC.), and ‘IF’ are “MINUS- WORDS.”7 
 
     Evolved sapient animals have some rudiments of innate mathematical know-how that 
enables them to reason well with the sentences of our native language—including 
relational sentences.   Originally an inspired conjecture of Thomas Hobbes, plus/minus 
discursive  reasoning will,  I expect,  be found to be a cognitively veridical 
psychological reality.   
             I believe we  unconsciously reckon ‘logibraically’ with the natural logical 
constants and  I expect that cognitive science will subject it to empirical tests. Of 
course cognitive scientists will not enter the picture and arrive at an empirical judgment 
on the plus/minus hypothesis before they become aware  that the logical constants 
natural language  have  a +/- character.   That will take some time since (“full 
disclosure”), despite repeated efforts to attract the attention of analytic philosophers to 
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the Plus/Minus character  of the natural language constants, I must report that I have 
failed to interest even academic logicians in the minus-like   behavior of natural  logical  
constants such as ‘if,’  ‘every,’ and ‘not,’ or the plus-like behavior of  ‘then,’ ‘some,’ 
‘and,’ and ‘is.’   Modern logical thinking, perhaps overly impressed by Frege’s concept-
script and his very strong opposition to “psychologism,” is  unaccustomed to regarding 
reasoning in a way that calls for actually describing what we mentally do when we  
reason with the variable free sentences of natural language to arrive at correct 
deductive judgments.  I am hopeful however that logical theory will increasingly be 
influenced by cognitive scientists who approach reasoning empirically, by studying  
what  is actually  taking place in  everyday “ratiocination.” It is plainly true that reason 
in sentences of our natural language, not  in formulas  of a constructionist  notation 
devised by a brilliant  19th  century  mathematical logician.  
         I firmly believe that we reason  by reckoning with the oppositively charged logical  
constants of natural language. If  that is mistaken, logicians ought at least be interested 
in showing that it  is mistaken but so far they have  shown little interest in my formal 
thesis that the natural constants are oppositively charged and no interest  at all in  the 
empirical, psychological,  hypothesis that  we reason intuitively by exploiting  the 
oppositively charged characters  of the natural logical constants in actual reasoning.  I 
first published the formal +/- thesis in 19708 and have elaborated on it in print  many 
times since . Some philosopher of langauge, notably Peter Strawson,  have commended 
the plus-minus hypothesis. Others, notably Peter Geach, have  angrily rejected it. 9  But  
in the main, both the formal and the empirical theses  have been met with a snubbing 
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silence; in any case there is not a single  article in the literature  that examines them 
critically.  I shall say no more about this curiously dismissive reaction to a serious  
challenge to the reign of predicate  logic. 
.   
§.5.1      Being aware that  distributing the external minus sign of  ‘-(-a+h+t)’ inward 
changes  the internal signs,   a teenager will  immediately recognize that it  is equal to 
‘+a+(-h)-t’.    The same teenager is just as quick to see that ‘Not: every archer  had hit  
some target’ is logically equivalent to  ‘Some Archer had missed  every target’; here we 
find that he reckons “logibraically,”  distributing the external “minus-word” ‘not’  to all 
the words in its scope and changing  ‘every{-}’ to ‘some{+},’  ‘hit{+} to ‘hit{-} ’ (treating  the 
contrary words  ‘hit’ and ‘missed’ as being positively and negatively ‘charged’) and  
changing  ‘some{+}’ to ‘every{-}:’  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
       Not-: Every- archer will+  hit+  some+ target ≡  Some+ archer will + miss+every- target 
        -      ( -        archer   +  (+hit)  +   target)  =     +     archer   +      (-hit)       -    target) 
 
   In transforming ‘not  every archer  will hit a target’ into ‘some  archer  will miss 
every target’ we reason in  just the way we reason in elementary algebra when 
transforming ‘-(-a+h+t)’ to ‘+a+(-h)-t’.   The difference between the two moves is that   
when  people reason with meaningful logical words like ’not’, ‘every’,  ‘some’ and ‘is’ or 
with logical contraries like ‘hit’ and ‘miss’,   they are unaware  that  they are reasoning  
with the  the negative charge of meaningful words like  ‘not,’ ‘every,’ and ‘missed  or the 
positive charge of meaningful words like ‘will,’ ‘some,’ and ‘hit’. 
  
15 
15 
  No acceptable  account of everyday actual reasoning  can  afford to make light of 
the fact that we think and reason in meaningful sentences of  natural language.   A 
cognitively veridical logic takes the characterization of logic as  ‘Laws of Thought’ 
literally. We normally reason by exploiting the +/- character of the logical constants of 
ourf language of thought. The advantage of reasoning that way is altogether lost when 
one  abandons natural language to reason in the canonical formulas of modern 
predicate logic.  The main task of a course in formal logic is to clarify for the students  
what is already intuitively obvious to  them. us.  A teenager of average intelligence  will 
take no more than a few seconds to move from (1) ‘Not every team won some a game’ to 
(2)‘Some team team failed  to win a single game.’   He learns how  he got (1) from (1) to 
(2) when his teacher tells his that he reasoned the +/- way by reckoning that  ‘-(-T + W 
+G )’ is entails ‘+ T + (-W) – G’ .   No one who is given an standard  MPL account of this 
inference is ever likely to say: Aha, so that how I intuitively”   so quickly and confidently 
arrived at that conclusion!”     When I got  round to teaching  logic the +/- way,  I  got 
many an ‘Aha!’  reaction to my logibraic account of an inference.  
                                An Aristotelian Logic of Natural Language    
 §6.  The +/- logic is ‘a logic of  natural language’ because the logical constants of 
natural language can be reckoned with as one reckons with the plus/minus operators of 
elementary algebra.  It is also an Aristotelian logic because, the Dictum de Omni --- the 
governing principle of inference in  Aristotelian Logic---   sanctions the logibraic  way of 
inference.  According to the D.O.: 
WHAT’S TRUE OF EVERY{-} M IS TRUE OF WHATEVER IS{+} AN M. 
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By the D.O., when  is said to be true every{-} M in one premise and ‘is{+} an M’  is said to 
be true of something   in a second premise,  the ‘middle  term,’ M,  occurring negatively 
in the first  premise, is said to ‘distributed;’  occurring  positively in the second premise, 
it is said to be ‘undistributed.’    When we add the first premise to the second, the 
negative middle term logibraically cancels the positive middle  term of the second 
premise,  replacing it by   in a conclusion in which no middle terms appears. When the 
middle term is undistributed in both premises, there can be no coancelation and no 
conclusion can be drawn (the “fallacy of undistributed middle”). Valid arguments have 
the form   
{}(-M) 
…+M 
                                                                    … 
  E.g., 
                        i.                                                           ii. 
  All- Mammals are+ warm-blooded            All- Mammals are+ warm-blooded                    -
M + P  All- Dolphins are+ Mammals                    Some+  Sea Creatures  are+ Mammals           
±S + M 
All- Dolphins are+ warm-blooded           Some+ Sea Creatures are+ warm-blooded     ±
S + P 
 
The D.O. also applies  to relational arguments.  Take  de Morgan’s ‘Tail of a Horse’ 
inference: 
      () Every horse is an animal, so every tail of a horse is a tail of an animal.  
Applying the D.O., we may prove ()  valid by an indirect argument showing that 
affirming its premise but denying its conclusion entails a self-contradiction. For 
suppose  it’s true of every horse that  it is an animal but  also true of some horse that  
its tail isn’t  a tail of an animal.  Since by the first premise, ‘is an animal’ is true of every 
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horse, it must, by the D.O.,  also be  true of whatever  is a horse.   So, given the second 
premise,  it would be true of  a horse whose tail is not a tail of any animal that  it is an 
animal whose tail is not a tail of an animal. That self-contradictory  consequence comes 
out clearly if we logibraically add the premise of  () to the denial of its conclusion.  
When we do that, we cancel  the middle term, ‘horse’ and arrive at a blatant absurdity of 
form ‘some X is not an X’, viz.,    that some tail of an animal is not a tail of an animal. 
    (1) –H+A:                  Every horse is an animal;                               ‘Is an animal’ is true of 
every horse. 
  +(2) +(t+H) – (t+A);    Some tail of a horse isn’t a tail of an animal;  It’s  true of  
somethng that is a horse   
                                                                                                             that its tail is not a tail 
of an animal.                                                                                                                                                    
(3) +(t+A) - (t+ A);                                  So, it’s  true of some animal  that its tail is not a 
tail of an animal.                               
                                                                         
         This reductio reasoning, which validates all arguments of form  ‘Every X is Y, so 
every R to an X is R to a Y, is an example of how traditional term logic accounts for 
arguments involving multiply general propositions. 
      Aristotelian term logic is a logic of natural language --- the variable-free ‘language of 
thought’  we  use  in actual everyday reasoning.  By contrast modern predicate logic 
(MPL) is a rational reconstruction of actual reasoning whose  symbolic language with 
its grammar of quantifiers and bound variables is not  the language of actual 
ratiocination.  
 The grammar of MPL is, in Quine’s words,  “an artificial grammar designed bylogicians 
…that we tendentiously call standard,”  a  “made for logic,”  grammar10 that “facilitates 
logical  inferences” which,  presumably, cannot be facilitated  in natural language  
whose logical grammar lacks the quantifier/bound-variable mechanism of MPL . Quine 
                                                 
10
 Cf. W.V. Quine, Philosophy  of Logic , Prentice Hall (1970), p35-36. 
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candidly acknowledges that many find the use of an artificial grammar disconcertingly 
irksome and  cumbersome.  But he firmly maintained that  its adoption   for standard 
logic  is scientifically necessary: .   
“All of austere science submits pliantly to the Procrustean bed of predicate 
logic.  Regimentation to fit it . . . serves not only to facilitate logical inference, but 
to  conceptual clarity.” 11   
In fact there are no valid  logical inferences that a  predicate logic can facilitate, 
that  cannot also be  facilitated by a simple, non-Procrustean,  Aristotelian term logic 
that exploits the +/- character  of the logical constants that  drive our everyday 
reasoning with the sentences of natural language.  There may be some other reasons to 
employ a Fregean rational reconstruction of deductive reasoning but there are none 
that  could support the claim that Frege’s constructionist logic is more ‘scientific’ than 
Aristotle’s logic of natural language.   
         Frege had an ingenious idea of how we might be reasoning. Though he 
believed that we could and should be reasoning the quantifier- bound-variable way, he 
probably knew better than to claim outright that people  actually were reasoning that 
way.  There is no reason to think they are.  Natural language, the language of actual 
ratiocination, is variable free.  It is true that  it lacks the quantifier-binding mechanisms 
of  modern predicate logic;  it is not true that this renders  MPL  deductively more 
powerful  than  the +/- logic of natural language.  
       Frege’s rational reconstruction of reasoning has been “Standard Logic” for a 
whole  century. As the Kneales say about Frege’s contribution to logic: “The use of 
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 W.V. Quine, Quiddities, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
(1987), p. 158. 
  
19 
19 
quantifiers to bind variables is the main distinguishing feature  of modern logical 
symbolism and the device which gives it superiority… over ordinary language. 1879 is 
the most important date in the history of the subject.”12   
           That generally accepted historical verdict  badly misprizes Aristotle’s logical  
legacy and grossly overestimates Frege’s.   Newton’s scientific physics did properly 
supplant Aristotle’s physics, but, unlike his Physics, Aristotle’s logic of natural 
language is not unscientific and Frege is no Newton.   
       Pace Frege, Dummett,  Quine, et al,  reasoning in natural language is  no less 
‘scientific’ than  reasoning in the quantifier-variable  manner of  modern predicate logic,   
it is only  much simpler, more natural, and more efficient,   enabling even children, who  
natively possess some algebraic know-how,  to  reason intuitively, rapidly,  but safely 
and correctly.  As Hobbes correctly averred, natural reasoning is “logibraic.”  Hobbes’s 
is a psychological theory.  Frege, who believed that natural language was deductively 
inferior,  opposed  “psychologism”  which  regarded logic  as “the  laws of thought  in 
the sense of an empirical psychological account of Frege could not be expected to be 
sympathetic to the Hobbesian thesis that we “silently”  reason the +/- way.   
Nevertheless, that way  turns out to be strikingly more efficient than any rational 
reconstruction of inference by the methods  of modern predicate logic. 
   Logical theory  now faces a future that will increasingly be shaped  by  empirical 
findings of cognitive science of how we actually reason and by evolutionary theories of  
the origins of rationality in our primate ancestors.   Once biologists and cognitive 
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 The Development of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 511.  1879 is 
 the year Frege’s Concept-Script appeared. 
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psychologists become aware of the hypothesis that we may be reasoning  by 
unconsciously exploiting the algebraic powers of the logical words of our language of 
thought, they will find ways to empirically test it.  Our sapient species uses natural 
language descriptively. It also uses natural language in reasoning. .  When I  think of a 
‘best explanation’ of  why our sapient species is as fluent in reasoning as it is in 
describing  the world, I cannot help but  believe that cognitive science will find that 
Hobbes  had  divined the correct answer  about five hundred years ago. 
               
  
